Regulation: What is there not to like? by Evison, Martin
Citation: Evison, Martin (2018) Regulation: What is there not to like? Science & Justice, 58 
(4). pp. 300-301. ISSN 1355-0306 
Published by: Elsevier
URL:  https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/... 
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355030618300947?via%3Dihub>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/34464/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page.  The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
Accepted Manuscript
Regulation: What is there not to like?
Martin Paul Evison
PII: S1355-0306(18)30094-7
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2018.05.006
Reference: SCIJUS 737
To appear in: Science & Justice
Received date: 4 April 2018
Revised date: 27 April 2018
Accepted date: 7 May 2018
Please cite this article as: Martin Paul Evison , Regulation: What is there not to like?.
The address for the corresponding author was captured as affiliation for all authors. Please
check if appropriate. Scijus(2017), doi:10.1016/j.scijus.2018.05.006
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As
a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The
manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before
it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may
be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the
journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Regulation: what is there not to like? 
 
Martin Paul Evison BSc MSc PhD FCSFS 
Professor in Forensic Science 
Faculty of Health and Life Sciences 
Northumbria University 
Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 8ST 
United Kingdom 
 
Tel: +44 191 243 7631 
Email: martin.evison@northumbria.ac.uk 
  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
At the heart of current debate in forensic science delivery in England and Wales is the roll -out of 
regulation, under the auspices of the Home Office Forensic Science Regulator, and a further 
anticipated move to make compliance a statutory expectation. 
These developments are the most recent in evolving policies that arose a quarter of a century ago or 
earlier, reflected in the reports of a series of governmental and judicial inquiries (1-6). The Runciman 
Report (2), delivered following the miscarriages of justice surrounding the IRA bombings of the 
1970s, recommended the establishment of a council to report on the performance and efficiency of 
forensic laboratories. The House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee Report  (3) 
of 2004-05, ‘Forensic Science on Trial’—conducted during a government move to privatize forensic 
science delivery—called for a council to act as regulator of the forensic services market and provide 
an overview of the use of forensic science in the justice system. The 2010-12 Science and Technology 
Committee report (4) noted that police laboratories were not accredited to the same standards as 
other providers and that the Forensic Science Regulator—now established within the Home Office 
and supported by a Forensic Science Advisory Council—should be provided with statutory powers. 
These recommendations were pursued in two further Science and Technology Committee reports 
(4,5) and Sir Brian Leveson’s Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (6), which also called for 
statutory powers for the regulator to ensure compliance with quality standards. 
Following the timely introduction of a series of codes and an appropriately ambitious schedule for 
compliance (7), the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) and staff are doing exactly what they should—
and probably all they can, until the anticipated moved to statute can be rolled into a particularly 
pressing parliamentary schedule.  
So, what’s the catch—if, indeed, there is one? 
One of the more interesting and resilient prophecies regarding forensic science privatisation policy 
during this period has been Paul Roberts’ 1996 (8) assertion that market instability and regulation 
would in combination lead to a market collapse. This hasn’t happened—yet, but market stability 
remains a major concern and regulation does impose a further financial burden in already 
economically challenging times. Larger organisations tend to like regulation, however, as they can 
afford to hire the staff—and, if necessary, the lawyers—and absorb the outlay. Smaller organisations 
struggle and the large ones can ‘gobble them up’ in  a process referred to in Public Choice (9) 
economics as ‘regulatory capture’. That might be a good thing for market stability in the short term, 
but it is doubtful whether it would be a good thing for the justice system if small groups of 
independent experts were to disappear. English law is adversarial, and the role of the independent 
expert in scrutinising the evidence adduced by the prosecution is fundamental to a fair trial.  There is 
also an element of risk in that once positions of market domination are achieved, the large provider 
may seek to resist or revise the rules of compliance for their own benefit (9). The fewer and larger 
the provider organisations, the more damaging the consequences would be if one of them were to 
fail or withdraw from the market. Nevertheless, an imperfect market may be a better than imperfect 
government control (9), as the collapse of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) implies. Similarly, a 
return to the police sector will reintroduce risks that the establishment of the FSS was intended to 
circumvent. 
Even in highly financed organisations, the implementation of quality standards has substantial 
implications for both expenditure and staff time and, if done poorly, will interfere with the ability of 
the organisation to meet its primary objectives. After 30 years in Higher Education, I am willing to 
assert that Universities with the highest quality of research and scholarship—performed by both 
staff and students—have validation and verification processes that are rigorous, but ‘light touch’. 
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Lower quality Universities have obstructive quality assurance systems. Bureaucrats like regulation—
from it flow resources and power (9). Where the organisation is the bureaucracy, a mechanistic 
culture based on servicing production schedules measured against key performance indicators  may 
result, which certainly has standards—but does not necessarily offer quality. 
If demands of regulatory compliance and workplace productivity are in conflict, this will lead to 
compromise. If these advantage production, it will be at the expense of standards and quality.  
The risk of bureaucratic non-experts defining and controlling the expert’s work represents a further 
threat to quality, and may actually generate demotivation and resistance—only leading to further 
difficulties. 
Bureaucracy led organisations may encourage knowing what to do, but offer nothing regarding 
knowing how to think. They are likely only likely to stifle creativity and innovation. 
Although quality standards can improve good practice in organisations, they can be something of a 
stick and sadly there is little available at present in the form of a carrot.  
Finally, it is worth remembering practically all the major scandals involving forensic science and 
forensic scientists have involved reputable mainstream organisations operating to the recognised 
standards of the day. Those who like to complain about ‘charlatans’ conveniently ignore this  and 
may be pointing the finger too much in the wrong direction.  Regulation and statute are no defence 
against flaws in organisational cultures and the odd individual. When encountered, these are far 
more likely to be inside the system not outside it. 
It is difficult to argue against standards and regulation in scientific work that underpins the justice 
system, but implementation of standards has limited meaning in the absence of a mature quality 
culture (10)—and a quality culture is just one component of a healthy culture overall. 
It may particularly timely, therefore, to recall the view held by the founders of the Forensic Science 
Society nearly 60 years ago and expressed in the Chartered Society’s current Royal Charter:  
“The objects of the Society are to advance the study, application and standing of forensic 
science and to facilitate co-operation amongst persons interested in forensic science 
throughout the world” (11) 
These aims show a foresight as prescient today as it was then. They offer the vision of a culture able 
to advance quality and standards, whether conceived of in a formal or informal sense, and to foster 
a community that is diverse and outward looking, and which contributes to and engages with the 
advancement of all knowledge relevant to the field. 
In my view, these aspirations must remain central to the development of our discipline if it is to 
navigate challenges in practice and policy, and flourish as a mature science of fundamental social 
value. 
The views expressed in this commentary are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those 
of the Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences. 
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